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American Oil Interests in China
I. INTRODUCTION
On August 17, 1982, United States oil companies submitted bids
to the government of the People's Republic of China (China) in order
to participate in developing its offshore oil resources. This comment
will discuss the historical, political and economic factors that have
induced China to open its doors to foreign participation in its oil
development. It will also analyze the current political developments
of China's Oil Ministry and the Ministry's interactions with other
Chinese governmental bureaus. Finally, the laws, regulations and
the Chinese model contract which affect the way in which United
States oil companies will do business in China will be discussed.
II. HISTORICAL, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC FACTORS
AFFECTING FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN CHINA
When the People's Republic of China was established in October,
1949, its government actively supported involvement with the outside
world. However, China's leaders defined the term"outside world"
narrowly, and consequently allowed only contacts with other com-
munist regimes.I This limited involvement resulted in the establish-
ment of strong military, technological and political links with the
Soviet Union. 2 China also strengthened its economic ties with
Communist-bloc nations by accepting foreign investment from the
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. 3
However, China's intense involvement with the Soviet Union
quickly disintegrated. Because of political and territorial disputes,
China ended its dependence on the Soviet Union during the late 1950's
and early 1960's. 4 In 1960, China began to pursue a policy of "self-
reliance" by reducing diplomatic, political and economic ties with
major foreign countries.5
In the early 1960's, after the Great Leap Forward (1958-1960)
failed to develop industrial growth, 6 certain Chinese leaders, such as
1. A. BARNETT, CHINA'S ECONOMY IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 2 (1981).
2. Id.
3. Rich, Joint Ventures in China: The Legal Challenge, 15 INT'L LAW. 183, 184
(1981).
4. BARNETT, supra note i, at 3.
5. Id. at 4.
6. F. SCHURMANN. IDEOLOGY AND ORGANIZATION IN COMMUNIST CHINA 297 (1968).
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yun, urged a more pragmatic and outward-
looking policy. 7 At that time, however, the most militant supporters
of self-reliance were the top radicals in China's Politburo, and thus,
self-reliance remained the dominant philosophy governing China's
foreign policy.8 The emphasis on self-reliance reached its peak in
the late 1960's during the Cultural Revolution. 9
In the early 1970's, after the Cultural Revolution, several Chinese
leaders, including Premier Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yun,
again argued for a more pragmatic foreign economic policy.' 0 As a
result, the importation of technology and foreign trade increased fairly
rapidly." The trend toward broadening foreign economic relation-
ships triggered strong opposition from top radicals who continued to
emphasize the importance of self-reliance.' 2 The resulting ideological
conflict was not resolved until after Mao Zedong's death in September,
1976, and the subsequent purge of China's top radicals (the "Gang
of Four") in October, 1976.'1
The fall of the Gang of Four and the legitimization of pragmatic
leadership under Chairman Hua Guofeng and Deng Xiaoping led to
a more politically hospitable climate for foreign investment. 14 This
receptiveness was evidenced by the "Four Modernizations" program
which was originally developed by Zhou Enlai and officially adopted
by the Chinese government only a few weeks after the arrest of the
Gang of Four.' 5 The program was implemented to modernize indus-
try, agriculture, national defense, science and technology by the year
2000. 16
Initially, the Four Modernizations program established unrealistic
capital construction goals, which in turn created serious imbalances
in the economy. 7 The Chinese government modified the program
7. See generally, BARNETT. supra note 1, at 584-85 n. 11.
8. Id. at 4.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 584-85 n.ll.
It. Id. at5.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. See generally Rich, supra note 3, at 184 (Chairman Hua Guofeng promoted a
"strengthening of socialist legality").
15. Bosco, The Law of the People's Republic of China on Joint Ventures Using Chinese
and Foreign Investment, 6 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 217, 217 (1980).
16. Brunsvold & Battle, The Prospects of Joint Ventures in China. 79 PAT. TRADE-
MARK REV. 3, 4 (1981)(The Four Modernizations program is also referred to as the "New
Long March").
17. Id. at 4.
120 [Vol. 6:119
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and readjusted its priorities. It de-emphasized the need to expand the
steel and construction industries, but continued to give high priority
to the petroleum industry. 8 However, since the Four Modernizations
program is a recent policy direction, Western investors fear that China
will again succumb to strong leftist political ideology, which would
abolish the legislation designed to protect foreign investment. '9
Abolishment of the Four Modernizations policy, however, is
unlikely. The most significant political consideration is the signing
of the United States-China Trade Agreement in July, 1979.20 The
agreement provides for reciprocal "most-favored nation" treatment
between the two countries.2' In addition, China recognizes com-
mercial contracts,22 accepts customary international trade practices
such as price, quality, delivery and terms of payment,23 and recognizes
effective protection of patents, trademarks and copyrights.2 4 China
also has agreed to accept arbitration as a means of settlement of
disputes.25 The trade agreement is in force until February 1, 198326
and can be extended indefinitely for successive three-year terms unless
China or the United States notifies the other party of its intent to
terminate the agreement at least thirty days before the end of the
term. 27
Other economic and political factors indicate that China's ide-
ological policies favor foreign investment. Since the Chinese econ-
omy lacks the necessary capital and technology to reach the objectives
outlined in the Four Modernizations program, China must rely on
foreign investment to attain its goals.28 Moreover, pressure along the
Sino-Soviet borders and the Chinese leadership's desire to raise the
standard of living also provide impetus for a stable foreign investment
18. Id.
19. Rich, supra note 3, at 186.
20. Agreement on Trade Relations, July 7, 1979, United States-People's Republic of
China, 31 U.S.T. 4651, T.I.A.S. No. 9630.
21. Id. art. II, para. 1.
22. Id. art. 1. para. 3.
23. Id.
24. Id. art. VI, para. I.
25. Id. art. VII1, para. 2.
26. Id. art. X, para. 1, 2. Under art. X, para. I, the agreement came into force on
Feb. 1, 1980, for a term of three years. However, under art. X, para. 2, the agreement was
automatically extended for an additional three-year term when neither China nor the United
States notified the other of their intent to terminate the agreement at least thirty days before
the end of the original term, Feb. I, 1983.
27. Id. art. X, para. 2.
28. Bosco, supra note 15, at 219.
19831
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
policy.29
The attempt to attract foreign investment may be seen as a move
by Deng Xiaoping and his supporters toward economic real-
ism. 30 Deng's statements and actions at the Chinese Communist Party's
Twelfth National Congress indicate that more pragmatic and moderate
philosophy will become the country's guiding ideology into the twenty-
first century. 3 The Twelfth Congress planned to rewrite the Party
Constitution to guarantee that there would not be a repetition of past
leftist mistakes.32
Thus, the purpose of the Twelfth National Congress is to con-
solidate the changes of the last few years and ensure long-term sta-
bility.31 With this stability, China seeks to create a hospitable ide-
ological climate for foreign investment as part of their modernization
strategy.
III. OFFSHORE OIL AND FOREIGN INVESTMENTS
Necessitated by its policy of self-reliance, China's development
of offshore resources from the late 1960's through mid-1976 was
based on a "do-it-yourself" approach. 34 By 1978, after several years
of research and the purchase of over $500 million of equipment, China
had completed very little serious offshore exploration and had only
experimented with offshore production in the Pohai Gulf. 35
During the same period, industrial oil consumption in China grew
rapidly, spurred op by the development of China's onshore Northeast
fields. 36 Now, however, the reserves in these fields are diminishing 7
and crude oil production has steadily declined since 1979.38
While crude oil production has declined, the demand for it is
expected to rise sharply in the next decade. China will need increas-
ing oil supplies for motor fuel and the continued development of
29. Id.
30. Note, Foreign Investment in the People's Republic of China: Compensation Trade,
Joint Ventures, Industrial property Protection and Dispute Settlement, 10 GA. J. INT'L &
CoMp. L. 233, 234 (1980).
3f. L.A. Times, Aug. 30, 1982, at Al.
32. L.A. Times, Sept.. 2, 1982, at A16.
33. L.A. Times, supra note 31, at Al.
34. BARNETr, supra note 1, at 480.
35. Id.
36. Taylor, Energy Conservation 9 CHINA Bus. REV., Feb. 1982, at 12, 14.
37. Clarke, China's Energy Plan for the 80's, 8 CHINA Bus. REV., May-June 1981,
at 48, 51.
38. Taylor, supra note 36, at 14.
[Vol. 6:119
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petrochemicals, synthetic fibers and plastics. 39
Recognizing that critical energy shortages will impede the coun-
try's economic plans, Chinese leaders have reassessed the previous
strategy of self-reliance and have reformulated China's energy pol-
icy. 40 The leaders realize that without foreign assistance, the ex-
ploitation of offshore oil resources would be unacceptably slow. 41
The decision to invite foreign investment is not based solely on
the desire for rapid development of crude oil resources. One of the
major economic reasons for inviting foreign investment is China's
need for massive imports of advanced foreign technology to achieve
the Four Modernizations by the end of this century. 42 However, China
lacks sufficient foreign capital and credit to finance these im-
ports. 43 By inviting foreign oil companies to invest in the Chinese
oil industry, China will obtain badly needed foreign capital44 and will
increase its hard currency earnings with which it may purchase foreign
technology .45
In addition to providing foreign capital, offshore drilling will
reduce China's energy vulnerability in the event of Soviet actions
against China's largest onshore facility, Daqing, located near the Sino-
Soviet border. 46 Offshore drilling will also enable China to assert
sovereignty over disputed areas in the South China Sea while pre-
venting exploration by other countries claiming ownership of the
areas. 47 Finally, foreign oil company offshore participation as
39. It has been estimated that if oil production does not grow steadily by 1990, China
will have to decrease oil consumption from its present rate of 40 million tons to an estimated
13 million tons in 1990 in order to achieve an economic growth rate of six percent during
1985-1990. Id.
40. Note, Legal Aspects of Sino-American Oil Exploration in the South China Sea,
14 J. 1NT'L L. & ECON. 443, 449 (1980)(retitled as GEO. WASH. J. INTL L. & ECON.).
41. BARNE-T, supra note 1, at 481.
42. Note, supra note 40, at 447. The Chinese government is committed to the success
of the offshore projects as a symbol of its Four Modernizations program. Thus, Beijing is
carefully shielding U.S. oil companies and their offshore oil projects from Chinese political
retaliation for U.S. import quotas on Chinese textiles and the U.S. stance on the Taiwan
problem. Woodard, The Drilling Begins, 10 CHINA Bus. REV., May-June 1983, at 18
[hereinafter cited as The Drilling Begins].
43. Note, supra note 40, at 447.
44. Brunsvold & Battle, supra note 16, at 4.
45. Brown, Tough Terms for Offshore Oil, 9 CHINA Bus. REV., July-Aug. 1982, at
34.
46. Note, supra note 40, at 447.
47. Other countries claiming ownership of disputed areas are Japan, Taiwan, South
Korea, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei and the Philippines. Beijing has carefully
limited its survey and contract areas to undisputed coastal areas to avoid international dis-
putes. Harrison, Conflicting Offshore Boundary Claims, 10 CHINA Bus. REV., May-June
1983, at 57. Despite Beijing's efforts, however, U.S. survey operations have exacerbated
Sino-Vietnamese relations. Hanoi issued a warning to foreign oil companies that they must
bear the consequences of their actions. Commentators have suggested that the positioning
of U.S. firms near these contested areas was politically motivated by the Chinese, since
U.S. involvement effectively merges U.S. and Chinese interests in the event of a conflict
between China and Vietnam. Note, supra note 40, at 457. 458 nn.96-97.
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compared to onshore participation will limit foreign social interaction
and influence.
48
China's leadership decided to initiate a crash program to rapidly
develop offshore oil resources. 49 In mid-1978, China invited foreign
oil companies to send representatives to Beijing to discuss conducting
seismic surveys of China's major offshore areas.50 By autumn of that
year, numerous American companies, including Union Oil of
California, Atlantic Richfield, Exxon, Phillips Petroleum, Standard
Oil, Pennzoil, and Mobil, were negotiating for the right to conduct
seismic surveys.5 Many Japanese and West European companies,
including the Japanese Petroleum Exploration Corporation, the Japan
National Oil Corporation, Idemitsu Kosan, British Petroleum, De-
minex (West Germany), ELF Aquitaine (France), ENI (Italy), Saga
Petroleum (Norway) and the Royal Dutch Shell Group, were also
negotiating for survey rights.5 2 These negotiations involved a 400,000
square kilometer area off China's coastline ranging from the Straits
of Taiwan in the north to the Tonkin Gulf in the south.5 3
In mid-1979, the Chinese signed an agreement for seismic survey
rights along the Chinese coast with six American companies: Exxon,
Mobil, Arco, Phillips Petroleum, Chevron/Texaco and Amoco.- These
companies were assigned six major blocks from south of Taiwan to
south of Hainan, and are the main operators in surveying most of the
South China Sea.55
The survey agreements were unique in many respects.5 6 For
example, the agreements provide for direct privity between the
American oil companies and the China National Oil and Gas Explo-
ration and Development Corporation (China National Oil). 5 7 In
48. Note, supra note 40, at 447.
49. BARNET. supra note I. at 481.
50. id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Note. supra note 40, at 450.
54. BARNEMr. supra note I, at 483.
55. Id.
56. Note, supra note 40, at 453:
57. Id.
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previous foreign trade transactions, the Chinese only authorized the
appropriate Foreign Trade Corporations (FTCs) to sign agree-
ments. 58 FTCs are organizations within the Ministry of Foreign Trade
which act as contractual middlemen for the Chinese end user.59 By
making China National Oil, the end user, a direct party to the agree-
ment, problems involving contracts lacking real parties in interest are
obviated. 6o
Another unique feature of the Survey Agreement, one that is rare
for American oil companies, is that survey costs are to be bome
completely by the American participants. 61 Normally, exploration
and development contracts awarded by a host country encompass
exploration, development and sometimes downstream market-
ing. 62 The Survey Agreement, however, only conferred the right for
an oil company to conduct seismic surveys within a designated
block. In exchange for these surveys, China merely promised to put
up certain blocks for competitive bidding. 63 None of the American
oil companies had contractual guarantees to subsequent exploration
and exploitation contracts. 64 The American oil companies were also
contractually obligated to (1) use their most advanced equipment and
technology in completing the surveys, (2) provide all raw field data
and processed data with interpretations within eight months of its
acquisition, (3) pay a 3.5 percent service fee, (4) provide specialized
training for Chinese personnel, and (5) provide $10 million in sub-
contracts for Chinese vessels and crews. 65 In addition, six original
American companies had to deliver survey data to early and late
participants who signed a "Participation Agreement" with
China. 66 The Participation Agreement conferred the same rights as
those given to the original participants except that the early and late
participants had none of the management, supervisory or decision-
making rights of the original participants. 67 While participation by
early and late participants did involve sharing survey costs with the
58. Id.
59. Id. at 453-54.
60. Id. at 454.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 459-60.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 455-56.
67. Id.
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
original participants, 68 it created more competition when the bidding
for exploration contracts began in August, 1982.
American oil companies' willingness to commit capital invest-
ment without exploration guarantees is a significant departure from
traditional oil industry practice. 69 The companies' decision to enter
into agreements that so dramatically favored the Chinese may have
resulted from a gentleman's agreement-that original participants
would receive preferential treatment when China awards the explo-
ration and development contracts. 70 The six original American parties
have been informed that they will have the opportunity to match the
highest bid submitted for the area where a particular company con-
ducted its surveys. If the original foreign party is willing to match
the bid, then that party will be awarded the final exploration con-
tract. 7' These understandings are not included in the formal docu-
ments and probably constitute parol evidence, inadmissible in United
States courts. 72 However, the Chinese have been known to rely on
extra-contractual understandings in business transactions. 73 Thus, it
is highly likely that the original participants will have the major
advantage when final bidding occurs. 74
Some delays have occurred in Beijing's deadlines for opening
the bidding process. 75 While seismic reports were being submitted
from 1980 to 1981, the oil companies were making enormous efforts
to educate the Chinese about the intricacies and details of offshore
oil contracts. 76 This was difficult since China has tried to compress
into only three years the preliminary studies that have taken other
developing countries thirty years to produce. 77 Moreover, the Chinese
had to draft laws on petroleum resources and taxes before United
68. Id. at 456. The American companies that did decide to participate as early or
late participants were: Cities Service, Hunt-Sedco, Murphy OilOccidental, Pennzoil, Shell,
Texas Eastern, Union Oil and Allied Chemical's Union Texas Asia Offshore. Foreign
company participants include: Ampol (Australia), AGIP (Italy), Cliff Oil (U.K.), Deminex
(West Germany), Hispanoil (Spain), INA (Yugoslavia) and the Royal Dutch Shell
Group. BARNETr, supra note 1, at 484.
69. Note, supra note 40, at 461.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. BARNEr-r. supra note I, at 484.
75. Id.
76. Green, The Offshore-Oil Race, 8 CHINA Bus. REV., July-Aug. 1981, at 55, 56.
77. Id.
(Vol. 6:1 19
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States companies could feel comfortable concluding negotiations. 78
Nevertheless, the pace of events in offshore oil development has
accelerated rapidly since February, 1982.79 The accelerated pace was
the result of several factors, including the enactment of the Foreign
Enterprise Tax Law and its accompanying regulations, effective January
1, 1982.80 In addition, the long awaited petroleum regulations were
released on February 10.1 United States companies had been waiting
for those two major steps to conclude negotiations. 82
China has also attempted to eliminate some of the bureaucratic
entanglements that have handicapped offshore oil development de-
cisions. In May, 1982, the Chinese leadership reorganized the
Petroleum Ministry.83 The Minister of Petroleum, Kang Xien, was
"kicked upstairs" as a State Councilor& and replaced by Metallurgy
Minister, Tang Ke. 85 Tang's appointment as Minister of Petroleum
was a domestic political compromise which indicates China's sensi-
tivity to foreign oil companies and their concerns.8 6 Tang Ke strongly
advocates using foreigners in China's resource development 87 and his
appointment is seen as a move by Chinese leaders to assuage the fears
of foreign oil executives as they begin to bid on offshore oil blocks.
88
Finally, to aid the accelerated pace of offshore oil development,
China has attempted to eliminate some of the tension between various
Chinese ministries. Article 4 of the Petroleum Regulations states that
the Petroleum Ministry is the competent authority in charge of the
exploitation of offshore petroleum resources in cooperation with foreign
78. Id.
79. Green, Offshore Business, 9 CHINA Bus. REV., May-June 1982, at 17 [hereinafter
cited as Offshore Business].
80. Nordberg & Price, People's Republic of China: New Income Tax on Foreign
Enterprises, TAX MGMT. INtFL J., July, 1982, at 8.
81. Offshore Business, supra note 79, at 17.
82. Green, supra note 76, at 56. After years of detailed negotiations, Arco signed a
production sharing agreement in September, 1982, six months after the Foreign Enterprise
Tax Law and the Petroleum Regulations were enacted. Certain non-U.S. companies, Japan
National Oil, ELF Aquitaine, and Total Chine, a subsidiary of Compagnie Franqaise des
Petroles, signed agreements with China in 1980, prior to the enactment of these regulations.
Arco's Deal With China Is A Tough Act To Follow, Bus. WK., Oct. 4, 1981.
83. Clarke, China's Organizational Revolution, 9 CHINA Bus. REv., July-Aug. 1982,
at 27, 29.
84. Id. at 29.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 32.
88. Id.
19831
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
enterprises.8 9 Moreover, the China National Offshore Oil Corporation
(CNOOC), established in February, 1982, 90 has full authority over
offshore development 9' and most likely will report directly to the
Ministry of Petroleum. 92
There are still potential conflicts among various ministries that
may slow offshore oil development. When the Ministry of Petroleum
was reorganized in May, 1982, analysts expected the Ministry of
Geology to be dissolved or downgraded93 to avoid infighting between
the two ministries. However, during this time the functions of the
Ministry of Geology were actually expanded. 94 It remains to be seen
whether future conflicts between the two ministries will cause delays
in reaching agreements with foreign oil companies.
Delays may also occur because CNOOC's authority to enter into
contracts is subject to approval by the Foreign Investment
Commission. 95 The Foreign Investment Commission is a department
of the newly formed Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and
Trade (MOFERT) which merged China's former Foreign Investment
Control Commission, Import-Export Commission, and the ministries
of Foreign Trade and Economic Relations with Foreign Coun-
tries. 96 The new ministry has one-third less staff than the organiza-
tions it replaced and two-thirds fewer departments. The general pur-
pose of the reorganization is to raise efficiency and cut red tape. 97 The
reorganization is a definite improvement over China's previous Min-
istry of Foreign Trade, which was often cumbersome and
slow. 9 However, although MOFERT will not be involved in direct
negotiations," its final authority to approve CNOOC offshore oil
89. Regulations of the People's Republic of China on the Exploitation of Offshore
Petroleum Resources in Cooperation With Foreign Enterprises art. 4 (1982), reprinted in
BEIJING REV., Feb. 22, 1982, at 14 [hereinafter cited as Petroleum Regulations].
90. Offshore Business, supra note 79, at 17.
91. Petroleum Regulations, supra note 89, art. 5.
92. CNOOC replaces CNOGEDC which handled offshore oil operations under the
.Ministry of Petroleum prior to February, 1982, and is now reduced to an onshore com-
pany. Offshore Business, supra note 79, at 18.
93. Clarke. supra note 83. at 32.
94. Id. The Ministry of Geology is responsible for the "protection. efficient ex-
ploitation, and multipurpose utilization of mineral resources." Apparently. the Ministry of
Geology will continue to take part in the development of some reserved offshore oil blocks.
95. Petroleum Regulations, supra note 89, art. 6.
96. Ludlow, China's New Foreign Trade Structure, 9 CHINA Bus. REV., May-June,
1982, at 30.
97. Id.
98. Green, supra note 76, at 56.
99. Ludlow, supra note 96, at 31.
[Vol. 6:119
American Oil Interests
exploration and development contracts may still hamper negotiations
and slow production schedules.
The current timetable is based on China's February 15, 1982 call
for bids covering four major areas in the northern part of the Yellow
Sea and its March 15, 1982 call for bids covering the southern part
of the Yellow Sea and the Gulf of Tonkin. 100 When China invited
foreign oil companies to come to Beijing to pick up bid packages,' 0
representatives from twenty-one U.S. firms10 2 arrived in Beijing on
May 10 to receive a package that included the offshore petroleum
regulations, a model contract, a bid proposal form, and tax
laws. 103 Twenty consortia and individual companies submitted 102
bids on 43 contract areas. ,04 The Chinese spent six months evaluating
the bids and in February and March of 1983, invited oil companies
to Beijing for contract negotiations.'0 5 CNOOC officials estimate rapid
negotiations. While oil company executives are wary of these pre-
dictions,'°0 most foreign oil companies expect to sign contracts before
the end of 1983, and to begin operations in the first quarter of 1984.107
IV. APPLICABLE LAWS AND THE MODEL CONTRACT:
THEIR IMPACT ON CONTRACT NEGOTIATIONS
When China offered its bidding package to foreign oil companies
on May 10, 1982, three important documents to the negotiating proc-
ess were placed in the package. They were the model contract, the
offshore petroleum regulations and the Foreign Enterprise (F.E.) Tax
Law.
A. The Model Contract
Notwithstanding the fact that China needs to expand its petroleum
output to achieve the Four Modernizations, the terms of the model
100. Offshore Business, supra note 79. at 17.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. Companies had a fixed 100-day period from May 10 to Aug. 17 to formulate
bid proposals.
104. The Drilling Begins, supra note 42. at 18.
105. Id.
106. Id. The drop in world crude oil prices and the general recession in the petroleum
industry may harden the negotiating stance of the oil companies, leaving CNOOC with the
difficult task of extending negotiations or giving in on basic terms.
107. Id. However, the foreign oil companies' predictions may be overly optimistic
since the CNOOC office in Beijing has a limited staff and probably cannot negotiate more
than four or five contracts simultaneously. In the unlikely event that CNOOC quickly signs
contracts for all forty-three contract areas, the logistics involved in drilling operations and
the limitations on supply base facilities will preclude rapid acceleration of drilling activity.
1983]
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contract underscore China's determination to be in control of offshore
development. 0 8 Because China's legal ties with the West are rela-
tively new, the Chinese have proceeded cautiously and with a solid
commitmentto certain principles.'°9 These principles reflect China's
desire to expand its own technological base rather than build a de-
pendence on foreign technology to exploit its resources."10 Ideally,
the Chinese would like a contract flexible enough to accommodate
any detrimental changes."'1
Generally, United States oil executives feel that the model con-
tract is unique when compared to agreements with other countries, 112
and contains certain provisions that will be difficult to negoti-
ate. 13 However, the model contract is considered workable as long
as these certain provisions are satisfactorily negotiated.
14
While part of the model contract may come under negotiation,
the contract is clearly open for bidding on three major points: (1) the
"work program," which includes the foreign company's schedule for
exploration, development and the number of wells; (2) the "factor
bid," which determines the production profit percentage the foreign
company will receive; and (3) "other contributions," which the for-
eign company is willing to make to China's offshore oil program or
to other sectors of the Chinese economy. "1
108. Brown, supra note 45, at 34.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 34-35.
112. Offshore Business, supra note 79, at 17. The model contract incorporates aspects
of the Indonesian, British, Brazilian, and Norwegian contract models. It contains elements
of a joint venture and a production sharing agreement. Id. The aspect of a production
sharing agreement whereby the foreign oil company is allowed a certain free share of the
annual production after recovery of costs is particularly attractive to the Chinese because it
involves the importation of necessary capital equipment without an outflow of scarce foreign
exchange. Note, supra note 40, at 469.
113. Brown, supra note 45, at 35.
114. The model contract is being used by the Chinese as a basic legal frame-
work. Because of its applicability to all foreign oil companies involved in offshore oil
exploration, the contract's function is similar to that of a legislative enactment. Goodwin,
The Evolving Legal Framework, 10 CHINA Bus. REV., May-June, 1983. at 43. However,
a statute governing contractual joint ventures between foreign companies and Chinese entities
that involve co-production (as with oil companies) and thus are not covered under the July
8, 1979 Joint Venture Law, will most likely be adopted in the near future. The statute will
list the contents of contracts for co-production, and in future arrangements involving co-
production, will reduce the flexibility that characterizes present co-production agree-
ments. Id. at 46.
115. Brown, supra note 45, at 35. Larger companies may offer financing as their
contribution in this area. Id.
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1. The work program
Under the work program, the foreign partner is expected to put
up all capital and bear all risks during exploration. 16 The company
that is awarded a contract has a set term in which to explore the
area. 117 For an area less than 2,000 square kilometers, the term is
five years, and for an area equal to or larger than 2,000 square
kilometers, the term is seven years." 8 The terms are divided into
stages. 19 For example, there are three stages in the seven year term,
consisting of three years, two years, and two years. After each of
the first two stages, the company must relinquish twenty-five percent
of the contracted area. 120
This provision has two purposes. As a performance guaranty,
it forces the foreign company to act quickly to determine which areas
it will relinquish and which it will reserve for further explora-
tion.121 As an escape mechanism, it gives the foreign company the
right to withdraw from the agreement after each stage is completed
if it is discouraged by its findings or high production cost projections. 122
Once an area has been explored and targeted for development,
CNOOC and the foreign company will jointly participate in the de-
velopment and production phases and China will contribute capital
for expenses. 123 At this time, when an area has been determined to
be commercial, CNOOC will have ninety days to contact the foreign
company in writing if it chooses not to participate or if its participation
will be less than fifty-one percent. 124 If CNOOC does choose to
participate, CNOOC and the foreign company will jointly develop
the area, CNOOC bearing fifty-one percent of the cost and the foreign
party, the remainder. 125 At the same time, the foreign company will
have ninety days to submit a development plan.' 26 Thus, the foreign
company will be in the difficult position of arranging financing for
the development stage before it receives any notice from CNOOC
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. .Id.
122. Id.
123. ld.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 37.
1983]
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advising it of CNOOC's involvement and consequently, the extent of
the foreign company's participation. 2
7
2. The x factor
The factor bid by the foreign company takes effect once a targeted
area goes into commercial production. The commercial production
period begins once a total of 100,000 tons of oil or 100 million cubic
meters of natural gas has been extracted. 1 28 Once an area starts com-
mercial production, output is divided between the parties according
to a complex formula for a term of fifteen years, extendable to thirty
years. 29 The formula used to divide output is as follows: 17.5% of
output goes to China (12.5% consisting of a royalty with a 5% In-
dustrial Consolidated and Commercial Tax); 50% of output is "cost
oil," which goes first to recover operating costs, second to exploration
costs, and finally to development expenditures; the remaining 32.5%
of output is divided into "share oil" and "allocable profit oil." 3 0 This
is calculated according to an x factor bid by the particular oil com-
pany. The share oil goes directly to China.'3' The remaining profit
oil is split 51/49% between China and the foreign company.' 32
The x factor works to make a division between share oil and
profit oil on the basis of the amount of oil produced. The division
is made on seven tiers 133 so that the percentage split for the first
million tons would be determined by the first tier x factor, the second
million tons would be split according to the second tier x factor, and
the remaining tiers would be split according to their respective x
factors. The result is that where more oil is produced, less will be
allocated to profit oil. 134
Surpluses in the output allocated to cost oil will be transfered to
profit oil, which is shared by China and the foreign com-
pany. 3 5 Additionally, while exploration and development costs are
being recovered, CNOOC can take over operation only by mutual
127. Id.
128. Id. at 35.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 36.
134. Id.
135. Id. However, the foreign company must have fully recovered its investment for
any assets used in implementing the petroleum contract, before CNOOC can unilaterally
take over operations. Petroleum Regulations, supra note 89. art. 22.
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agreement. 3 6 Once exploration and development costs are recouped,
however, CNOOC has the right to take over operations by unilateral
decision. "I
The profit oil that the foreign company does retain can be sold
on foreign markets. 138 These oil profits need not be remitted to the
Bank of China (BOC), and thus, the BOC will not set exchange rates
or limit the amount of hard currency that can be repa-
triated. 13 9 However, CNOOC does reserve the right to limit the des-
tination of the crude oil.14o
3. Other contributions
Foreign companies have no objections to the profit formula. "41 If
a reasonable bid is accepted, foreign participants will receive a fair
share. 142 However, foreign oil companies are concerned with other
aspects of the model contract.
The provision in the model contract regarding technological con-
tributions will cause problems for all foreign oil companies. 143 The
model contract provides that the foreign company must transfer all
technology, including data design and software gathered during ex-
ploration, to China without charging royalties.' 44 Certain industry
observers feel that the contract would obligate a United States oil
company to release technology that is not in its China opera-
tions. 1 45 These observers argue that designs which are patented or
copyrighted by other companies would possibly be covered by the
contract. 46 Such a possibility would conflict with the Reagan
Administration's concern over the United States' loss of technology
and its efforts to tighten restrictions on technology transfer. 147 The
United States Department of Commerce is taking a closer look at all
applications for China and rejecting large numbers of them. 148 The
United States' policy in this area is destined to create additional
136. Id. at 35.
137. Id. at 36.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 37.
140. Id. at 36.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 37.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Wall St. J., Oct. 12. 1982, at 32.
148. Id.
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problems when United States oil companies negotiate the technology
transfer provision in the model contract.
Control is another important issue that foreign companies will
want to carefully negotiate. The model contract calls for the creation
of a Joint Management Commission (JMC) composed of represen-
tatives from CNOOC and the foreign company. 149 The JMC will be
chaired by a CNOOC representative and will have control over every-
day operational decisions as well as planning and budgeting deci-
sions. 150 Some companies fear that, without clarification of the com-
mittee's functions, JMC's control could hinder operations and create
additional costs. 15
1
B. The Petroleum Regulations
Apart from the model contract, United States oil companies fore-
see problems with certain guidelines in China's Offshore Petroleum
Regulations. The Regulations provide that foreign companies must
give preference to Chinese personnel 152 at international wage rates, 53
train Chinese personnel, and keep the percentage of Chinese personnel
steadily rising in all phases of exploration and development. 114
United States companies are worried about the shortage of skilled
Chinese laborers and the fact that training Chinese personnel could
be prohibitively expensive, especially if training were to take place
in the United States. 151 In addition, the companies must pay specific
international wage rates as compared to lower labor costs in other
149. Id.
150. Id. The JMC's decision-making powers include determining whether oil fields
are commercially viable, approving major expenditures, and appointing expert groups to
investigate exploration operations. Denny, The Quest for Control, 10 CHINA Bus. REV.,
May-June, 1983, at 26.
151. The JMC structure gives the Ministry of Petroleum and CNOOC authority to
approve major policy and procurement decisions. Since the JMC can be convened any time,
at the request of either party, the Chinese will be involved in all decisions of conse-
quence. Denny, supra note 150, at 26.
152. Petroleum Regulations, supra note 89, art. 12.
153. Brown, supra note 45, at 37.
154. Petroleum Regulations, supra note 89, art. 12.
155. Woodard, Supplying Offshore Services, 9 CHINA Bus. REV., Mar.-Apr., 1982,
at 9, 13. Proposals have been submitted to CNOOC regarding a combined training institute,
based in southern China and utilizing foreign faculty and trainers. Although the institute
could cost 15 to 20 million dollars per year to operate, it is a cost-effective alternative to
individual company training programs. The Drilling Begins, supra note 42, at 4.
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parts of the world. 15 6 Moreover the Chinese government will retain
a higher percentage of the salary given to laborers than the percentage
usually retained by other countries. 5 7 These enormous disparities
between Chinese wages and those of laborers in other countries could
cause tension and morale problems for United States companies. 1
58
China's Offshore Petroleum Regulations also contain provisions
requiring foreign companies to give preference to (1) Chinese design
corporations for master and engineering designs,15 9 (2) Chinese man-
ufacturing and engineering companies for facilities (platforms, build-
ings, artificial islands, etc.),' 60 (3) Chinese equipment and
materials, 161 and (4) Chinese subcontracting services for prospecting,
well-drilling, diving, helicopters, vessels and onshore bases. 1
62
Although the Petroleum Regulations state that foreign companies
need use only the above-mentioned services if they are competitive
in price, efficiency, and service, the Chinese will enforce these
preference clauses through certain devices.1 63 Exploration contracts
and operational agreements will be combined for each successful
bidder, thus forcing the bidding companies to use Chinese rigs, ser-
vices, and supplies. 64 In addition, foreign equipment and chemicals
may be denied customs clearance if the Chinese feel they already
have or could develop adequate supplies of these materials. 
65
Oil companies fear that these preference clauses could lead to
unreasonable delays if Chinese companies prove to be
156. Total Chine, Japan National Oil and ELF Aquitaine are using Chinese jack-rigs
staffed predominantly by Chinese crew and rig hands. Wages paid to Chinese rig hands are
more than double the current rate in Southeast Asia, with less than ten percent going to the
worker. The Drilling Begins, supra note 42, at 23.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Petroleum Regulations, supra note 89, art. 18.
160. Id. art. 19.
161. Id. art. 20.
162. Id. art. 2 1:
163. Woodard, supra note 155, at I1. Japan National Oil, Total Chine and Arco
have already begun using their traditional suppliers and service companies, most likely
because China cannot produce materials or services that conform to industry standards. The
Drilling Begins, supra note 42, at 21. However, the majority of these companies signed
agreements before the Petroleum Regulations were enacted. Since China has a strong interest
in developing its own technological base, it is almost certain these preference clauses will
be enforced more stringently in the future.
164. Woodard, supra note 155, at 12.
165. Id.
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unreliable. '66 Additional delays could occur if every purchase and
subcontract needs to be approved by the JMC and other Chinese
organizations.' 67 Since offshore drilling operations run on a tight
twenty-four hour schedule, chronic delays caused by Chinese sub-
contractors and bureaucratic red tape would increase exploration and
development costs. ,
68
The preference clauses could also complicate already existing
relationships between foreign companies and their customary suppliers
and subcontractors.' 69 This could result in forcing foreign subcon-
tractors to use Chinese equipment, services and labor for part or all
of their operations in China. 1
70
Despite these problems, the Petroleum Regulations have reas-
sured United States companies in one area. The regulations state that
the Chinese government will protect investments made by foreign
companies and that profits may be repatriated.' 7' In addition, any
assets purchased and built by the foreign company in implementing
the petroleum contract will become the property of CNOOC but only
when the foreign company has fully recovered its investment in those
assets. 172
C. The Foreign Enterprise Tax Law
One of the most important issues that concerned United States
companies was whether income taxes paid in China could be credited
against United States taxes. 173 If the Chinese tax were not credited
against United States taxes, the threat of double taxation would cause
many United States companies to withdraw from the Chinese theater. 1
7 4
Fortunately, China took tremendous care in structuring its
166. Brown, supra note 45, at 37. Foreign oil companies have adopted a number of
approaches in attempting to work within the framework of the preference clause. One
approach is to enter into a licensing agreement. Another approach is to form a joint venture,
either between U.S. and Chinese entities or Hong Kong and Chinese entities. Goodwin,
supra note 114, at 44. These joint ventures qualify for "preference," usually granted to
Chinese organizations seeking to sell services and equipment. In fact, CNOOC has already
established two such joint ventures, one with Dresser Atlas Company of Houston and one
with the Geophysical Company of Norway. Denny, supra note 150, at 27.
167. Brown, supra note 45, at 37.
168. Woodard, supra note 155, at 11.
169. Id. at 12.
170. Id.
171. Petroleum Regulations, supra note 89, art. 8.
172. Id. art. 22. Rental equipment provided by any third party is excluded from
CNOOC ownership.
173. Woodard, supra note 155, at 13.
174. Id.
[Vol. 6:1 19
American Oil Interests
corporate income tax to be covered by the United States foreign tax
credit.175  During the enactment of the Federal Enterprise Tax Law
and its accompanying regulations, officials of the United States
Treasury and private tax practitioners advised the Chinese regarding
the creditability of their taxes for United States tax purposes. 17 6 As
a result of this concern, the United States Internal Revenue Service
issued a private letter ruling stating that three major taxes under the
F.E. Tax Law are creditable against United States income taxes., 7
The primary Chinese tax is an income tax computed at progres-
sive rates on amounts of taxable income. 178 The central income tax
reaches a top level of forty percent. 79
The Regulations implementing the Chinese Foreign Enterprise
Tax Law also contain provisions for the calculation of taxable income
similar to United States tax principles. 80 Taxable income is deter-
mined by reducing gross sales or income by the cost of goods sold;
selling, operating, and administrative expenses; and discounts, allow-
ances, sales taxes and refunds.' 8' Regulation article 26 states that
foreign oil companies will be deemed to have received income at the
time the crude oil is divided according to the model con-
tract.8 2 Moreover, the amount of income is computed on the basis
of a price that is adjusted periodically in accordance with the market
price for crude oil of comparable quality. ' Discussions with Chinese
officials indicate that the market price referred to in article 26 is the
international market price. 84
In addition to the central income tax, a local income tax of ten
175. Id.
176. Nordberg & Price, supra note 80. at 14.
177. Private Letter Ruling 8238037 [ 4614(82)] (1982), reprinted in Nordberg &
Price, supra note 80, at 14.
178. The Income Tax Law of the People's Republic of China Concerning Foreign
Enterprises of 1982 art. 3, translated in TAX MGMT. INT'L J., July, 1982, at 18.
179. Id. Some subcontractors explored the possibility of establishing offices in special
economic zones (SEZ) in order to be subject to a special tax rate of fifteen percent instead
of the higher tax rate under the F.E. Tax Law. The Chinese have rejected this approach on
the basis that the purpose of the reduced tax rates in the SEZ is to help to develop these
zones, not to create a tax haven- for U.S. companies. Goodwin, supra note 114. at 45. 46.
180. Nordberg & Price, supra note 80. at 10.
181. Id.
182. Regulations for the Implementation of the Income Tax Law of the People's
Republic of China Concerning Foreign Enterprises of 1982 art. 26. translated in TAX MGMT.
INT'L J., July. 1982, at 19, 22-23 [hereinafter cited as Tax Regulations].
183. Id.
184. Nordberg & Price, supra note 80, at 12.
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percent is imposed on the same taxable income." 5 Thus, the foreign
company's revenue from its sale of crude oil will probably be taxed
at a maximum rate of fifty percent under the F.E. Tax Law.
8 6
A third tax (a withholding tax) imposes a twenty percent tax on
all dividends, interests, rentals, royalties and other Chinese sources
of income obtained by foreign enterprises which do not have
"establishments" in China. 87 However, the withholding tax is not
applicable to foreign oil companies since Regulation article 2 defines
an establishment to include sites for the exploitation of natural re-
sources which will necessarily be maintained by the compa-
nies."'88 Therefore, income which would otherwise be subject to the
withholding tax instead will only be taxed under the central and local
income taxes with a maximum rate of fifty percent. 189
The Tax Regulations also provide that reasonable exploration
expenses incurred by an oil company may be amortized over a period
of not less than one year. '90 These expenses may be amortized against
income firom an oil or gas field that has already begun commercial
production.191 During the development phase, expenditures must be
capitalized and amortized over at least a six year period.
1 92
185. The Income Tax Law of the People's Republic of China Concerning Foreign
Enterprises of 1982 art. 4, translated in TAX MGMT. INT'L J., July, 1982, at 18.
186. Brown, supra note 45, at 36. It is difficult for some supply and equipment
subcontractors to compute income on a net income basis due to the large capital costs of
their equipment and the difficulty of allowing depreciation and other deductions to the
different countries where the equipment is used. These subcontractors may choose to utilize
a "deemed profit" approach whereby they pay a certain percentage (probably ten percent)
of their gross income, or they may elect to pay taxes on a net income basis. The major oil
companies will pay taxes only on a net income basis. Goodwin, supra note 114, at 44.
187. The Income Tax Law of the People's Republic of China Concerning Foreign
Enterprises of 1982 art. 11, translated in TAX MGMT. 1Nlr'L J., July, 1982, at 19.
188. Tax Regulations, supra note 182, art. 2, at 20. However, financial institutions,
supply and service companies, and other foreign entities without establishments in China
are subject to the withholding tax. Goodwin, supra note 114, at 45.
189. The twenty percent withholding tax is applicable to any dividends, interests,
rentals, royalties, etc., of any Chinese source income that is not attributable to the business
of a taxpayer's Chinese establishment. See The Income Tax Law of the People's Republic
of China Concerning Foreign Enterprises of 1982 art. 11, translated in TAX MGMT. INT'L
J., July, 1982, at 18. Income taxed at this twenty percent rate is not subject to the progressive
rates of the central income tax. Id. art. i, translated in TAX MGMT. INT'L J., July, 1982,
at 18. For instance, if a foreign company receives rental income from the lease of equipment
in China, the rental income would be taxed at twenty percent, not the progressive tax of the
central income tax, if the lease is unrelated to the business operations of the foreign enterprise
in China. Nordberg & Price, supra note 80, at 9.
190. Tax Regulations, supra note 182, art. 22.
191. Id.
192. Id. art. 18, at 22.
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Amortization begins from the month in which an oil field starts pro-
duction. 93 All of the expenditures are capitalized and amortized on
an overall basis. 19 4 Thus, all expenditures are capitalized and treated
as having the same useful life regardless of their type.195 Although
not expressly stated in the Regulations, the Chinese have confirmed
that if a field is abandoned, the remaining unamortized expenses may
be used to offset income from other fields. 1
96
D. The Industrial Consolidated and Commericial Tax
A consideration of applicable tax laws should also take into
account China's Industrial Consolidated and Commercial Tax
Law. This tax is 5 percent of the 17.5 percent of output off the top
that goes to China 97 which is not creditable against U.S. income
taxes. 98
V. CONCLUSION
Because of China's history of foreign domination by countries
during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, along with its
current policy of self-reliance, China is determined to maintain ex-
tensive control over offshore drilling of its oil resources. As a result,
the original survey agreements and model contract dramatically favor
the Chinese. It remains to be seen whether U.S. companies will be
able to negotiate favorable conditions in those few areas (i.e., the
work program, the x factor, company control, technology transfer)
that the Chinese have left open for negotiation.
Phillips Petroleum Company's Chairman, William C. Douce,
feels that "China is in no position to insist very far" in upcoming
contract talks. '99 Yet, many of his rivals are worried that the conces-
sions Arco has made to China when it signed its agreement in
September, 1982, will leave them at a disadvantage. 200 Arco has
settled for less favorable terms than ones China signed in 1980 with
193. Id. art. 16, at 21.
194. Id.
195. Nordberg & Price, supra note 80, at 12.
196. Id.
197. Brown, supra note 45, at 35.
198. Woodard, supra note 155, at 13.
199. Arco's Deal With China IsA Tough Act To Follow, supra note 82, at 43. However,
the overall success ratio of early drilling programs along the Chinese continental shelf is
very encouraging, indicating that indeed, China is in a position to insist upon tough terms. The
Drilling Begins, supra note 42 at 19.
200. Id.
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Japan National Oil, ELF Aquitaine, and Compagnie Frangaise des
Petroles. 201
China's hard negotiating stance, in addition to Arco's major
concessions, will result in long and difficult negotiations before con-
tracts with other oil companies are signed. If Arco's negotiating
results are any indication, these companies may find that they must
do business the way China wants them to, or not at all.
Loretta D. Rich
201. Id.


